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In Germany, dependent employees take almost 30 days of paid vacation annually.
We enquire whether an individual’s trade union membership affects the duration of
vacation. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the period
1985 to 2010 and employing pooled OLS-estimators, we find that being a union
member goes along with almost one additional day of vacation per year. Estimations
exploiting the panel structure of our data suggest that a smaller part of this vacation
differential can be due to the union membership status, while self-selection effects
play a more important role.
JEL Classifications: J 22; J 33; J 51; J 81
Keywords: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP); Paid vacation; Trade union
membership1 Introduction
Annual working time varies greatly across countries. In 2012, employees worked about
1,800 hours in the United States and 1,650 hours in the United Kingdom, while the
corresponding figure was 1,400 for Germany (see OECD 2013, Table K, which includes
full- and part-time workers). A substantial part of this gap is due to differences in
vacation time. According to the European Union Working Time Directive, there is a
statutory minimum of paid annual vacation of four weeks, whereas in the United States
there are no such regulations (Ray et al. 2013). Furthermore, the actual duration of
paid vacation in Germany of almost six weeks per annum exceeds the statutory
entitlement substantially and is about twice as high as in the United States and also
greater than in the United Kingdom.1
A reduction of working time has long been a prominent objective of trade unions.
However, there is little knowledge about the success of such endeavours. The few
studies analysing empirically the strength of trade unions and weekly or annual
working time provide some, but certainly no conclusive evidence of a negative
correlation (cf., inter alia, Burgoon and Baxandall 2004, Alesina et al. 2005, Faggio and
Nickell 2007, Causa 2009, Berger and Heylen 2011, and Oh et al. 2012). With respect
to vacation time, the evidence is even scarcer. It suggests that individuals covered by
collective bargaining agreements enjoy longer vacations in the United States (Buckley
1989, Buchmueller et al. 2004) and Japan (Ohtake 2003) and higher vacation entitle-
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ship enhances vacation entitlements in Great Britain (Bryson and Forth 2011, p. 267 f )
and both entitlements and the days of vacation taken in the United States (Green and
Potepan 1988, Buchmueller et al. 2004, Maume 2006, Altonji and Usui 2007). More
precisely, the estimated coefficients suggest that union members take between half and
a full week of vacation more than non-members in the United States. Finally, Alesina
et al. (2005) investigate the distinct development of working time in the United States
and Europe. They also look at paid vacation of full-time employed heads of household
and show that union members take about 3 days paid vacation per annum more than
non-members in Germany in 2001. The authors also establish a positive correlation for
the United States. However, none of the analyses thoroughly tackles the issue of
whether the observed membership effect on vacation can be viewed as causal or is due
to the selection of vacation-prone individuals into trade unions.
A further feature of the extant studies is that they predominantly refer to Great
Britain and the United States. In both countries union density and coverage by collective
bargaining agreements coincide to a large extent in the private sector.3 Therefore, trade
unions may be less concerned with free-riding activities of covered non-members than
they have to be in a country such as Germany, where coverage by collective bargaining
substantially exceeds union density. Consequently, in this contribution we empirically
analyse the relationship between individual trade union membership and the number of
vacation days taken in Germany and investigate whether the observed correlation is due
to selection effects. Accordingly, we do contribute to the literature on the consequences
of an individual’s union membership, but not on trade union coverage effects.
There are numerous reasons why individual union membership can affect the
duration of paid vacation. First, there is evidence that trade unions attempt to extend
entitlements laid down in collective contracts solely for its members. For example, one
of the largest unions worldwide, the German public sector union ver.di, was able to
bargain an extra two days of paid vacation for some of its members.4 Since many
employees covered by the collective contract do not belong to ver.di, these extra vac-
ation days are related to an individual’s membership status. Second, in some industrial
relations settings, only union members are legally able to enforce collectively negotiated
vacation entitlements in excess of the legal minimum. Third, it can be argued that trade
unions provide their members with better information about vacation entitlements and
the conditions under which employees can enforce them.5 Fourth, union members may
be better able to establish working conditions in accordance with their preferences than
non-members, for example, with regard to working hours, shift work and absence
periods. Such greater congruence between desired and actual conditions would reduce
the need to utilise vacation in order to reconcile a mismatch. Finally, the relationship
between vacation and union membership can also be viewed from an exit-voice
perspective. If going on vacation is viewed as a short-term exit, members could be
expected to take fewer vacation days because the trade union provides a voice mechan-
ism. However, absence from work could also be interpreted as a voice mechanism.
Since members have to fear reprisals less than non-members, given that unions provide
them with legal advice and representation, the voice mechanism ‘vacation’ may be
employed more extensively by members. All in all, the majority of arguments suggest
that trade union members can take more days of paid vacation than non-members.
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observed for other reasons than those enumerated above. First, people may have
characteristics unobservable to the researcher which make them both more likely to be
a union member and to take more paid vacation. Second, union membership could be
an empirical proxy for institutional features of the industrial relations system which are
associated with higher vacations. In Germany, this may be the case because employees
who work in firms covered by collective bargaining or plants in which a works council
exists obtain more paid vacation than employees who work in otherwise similar firms
or plants without such institutions.
In order to analyse the relationship between individual trade union membership and
the number of paid vacation days taken, we use data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP) for the period 1985 to 2010. Employing a pooled OLS-estimator, we show
that trade union members have almost one day more vacation than non-members
annually, controlling for a host of demographic and workplace related variables.
Assuming 200 working days per year, the monetary equivalent of the additional day of
vacation is about 0.5% of annual gross income and would cover 50% of the union
membership fee. This suggests that additional vacation could represent a substantial
private gain from individual trade union membership which limits free-riding
behaviour.
This finding is all the more remarkable because previous analyses have not been able
to establish a union membership wage effect in Germany (cf., for example, Schmidt
and Zimmermann 1991, Fitzenberger et al. 1999, and Goerke and Pannenberg 2004).
Moreover, there are only few studies in which other differences have been looked at.
Goerke and Pannenberg (2011), for example, show that trade union members in
Western Germany are less likely to be dismissed individually than non-members. In
addition, Goerke and Pannenberg (2015) estimate that union members take about a
day more of sickness-related absence annually than non-members. This effect is
quantitatively comparable to the estimated OLS-vacation differential between members
and non-members.
To cater for the concern that the observed vacation effect arises because individuals
select themselves into union membership due to time invariant unobserved characteris-
tics, we additionally employ linear fixed-effects specifications. The coefficients remain
positive but become considerably smaller in magnitude (less than 0.45) and are also
estimated less precisely, i.e. only significantly positive at the 10%-level in two out of
three of our preferred specifications. This suggests that the largest part of the pooled
OLS union membership-specific differential of almost one day is due to selection into
membership. This interpretation is supported by the results from nonlinear correlated-
random effects specifications.
We also deal with the second issue, namely that union membership represents an
empirical proxy for high vacation entitlements due, for example, to firm characteristics.
To this end, we initially control for firm size and industry effects in our empirical
specifications. Furthermore, we consider a subgroup of firms which are overwhelmingly
covered by collective bargaining and almost all have a works council. Additionally, we
present estimates of the relationship between individual union membership and the
number of vacation days taken for a subsample of years for which we have information
about vacation entitlements. Such entitlements are also likely to reflect collective
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employer in order to account for time-invariant, unobservable firm characteristics in
fixed-effects specifications. We find significantly positive correlations between individ-
ual trade union membership and paid vacation in all pooled OLS specifications and a
marginally insignificant estimated coefficient of individual membership in the FE
specification of the stayer sample. As a further robustness check, we distinguish be-
tween the private and public sector on the one hand and between services and industry
on the other. The findings indicate that the union membership effect on vacations is
primarily a private sector phenomenon and quantitatively stronger in services than in
the industrial sector. Finally, we explore the impact of experience.
Relating these insights to the literature, our contribution is threefold: To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to thoroughly investigate the relationship between indi-
vidual trade union membership and vacations days for a cooperative industrial relations
system, such as the German one. Second, the institutional setting in Germany ensures
that we identify the impact of an individual’s membership in a trade union. This is in
contrast to, for example, the United States, where union membership and collective
bargaining generally coincide. Third, combining our findings from fixed-effects and
correlated-random-effects specifications for a variety of specifications suggests that the
larger part of the estimated OLS membership vacation differential is due to self-
selection. Individuals who have stronger preferences for vacation are more likely to be
a trade union member or they exhibit other unobserved characteristics which lead to a
greater likelihood of being a union member and to a more extensive use of vacation
entitlements.
For trade unions, our findings may be regarded as bad news. First, the panel
estimates suggest that union membership can increase vacation by at most half a day
annually. Such an effect could only help to establish a relatively small private benefit
from individual membership, equivalent to less than a quarter of the membership fee.
Second, if union members take an extra day of vacation, irrespective of whether this is
a true membership or a selection effect, their effective labour costs will be higher than
those of non-members by about 0.5%, and firms will have fewer incentives to employ
them, ceteris paribus.
The further paper develops as follows. In the next section, we describe the German
institutional setting, while in Section 3, we outline the available data and the empirical
strategy. Section 4 provides some descriptive results as well as the main findings of
our regression analyses. In Section 5, we present various robustness checks. Section 6
concludes.
2 Institutional background
2.1 Trade union membership and industrial relations in Germany
In 1985, about 35% of dependent employees belonged to a trade union in the former
Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. the western part of the country. This fraction has
fallen to about 18% in the re-unified country in 2011. Moreover, union density in the
public sector is about twice the rate in the private sector (cf. Visser 2013). Union
members generally pay a tax-deductible membership fee of 1% of their gross wage. In
exchange, they are entitled to strike pay, legal advice, and support by union officials in
case of conflicts with their employers. Relative to the average working population, trade
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work in larger firms. Additionally, they are more likely to be employed in firms covered
by collective bargaining agreements and having a works council, inter alia because
these institutions are more prevalent in large establishments (cf., f.e., Goerke and
Pannenberg 2004, Schnabel and Wagner 2007, Fitzenberger et al. 2011).
These two features, collective bargaining and works councils, characterise the dual
structure of the German system of industrial relations. Collective bargaining agree-
ments determine wages and overall working conditions, including vacation entitle-
ments, mainly at the industry level, while works councils constitute a co-determination
body at the plant level. According to the Works Constitution Act as the relevant
law, works councils can be set up in private sector establishments with at least five
permanent employees. They have information, consultation and codetermination
rights which become more extensive with firm size. However, works councils are
generally not allowed to bargain over issues already dealt with in collective bar-
gaining agreements, such as wages and vacation entitlements. In addition to works
councils, there are so-called personnel councils, which cover most public sector
employees. They have similar or more extensive rights than their private sector
counterparts.
In 2012, bargaining coverage in Germany was almost 60%, while wages and working
conditions for a further 20% of employees were determined in line with collective bar-
gaining agreements, either because individual contracts referred to collective agree-
ments or employers voluntarily applied their provisions. Ten years earlier, coverage had
been about 10 percentage points higher. In the public sector, almost all employees are
subject to collective negotiations (Ellguth and Kohaut 2005, 2013, Visser 2013).
The regulations contained in collective bargaining agreements are legally binding
only for the signatories of the respective contracts, that is, for members of trade
unions who work in firms which have signed a firm-level contract or which belong
to an employer association that has concluded an industry-level contract. Conse-
quently, a large majority of the employees covered by such agreements does not
belong to a trade union. Nonetheless, firms generally apply collective agreements
to all employees irrespective of an individual’s union membership status, which
may not even be known to the employer. Therefore, the remuneration of em-
ployees, working time arrangements and many non-wage compensation elements
are determined by collective bargaining for an overwhelming fraction of private-
sector employees.
The opportunities to limit collective bargaining outcomes to trade union mem-
bers, as described with respect to vacation entitlements in the Introduction, are
limited by law. Closed-shop arrangements, for example, are not allowed and the
constitution grants all individuals the right to set up trade unions, or to abstain
from doing so, and declares all steps to obstruct this right as illegal. Additionally,
the Non-discrimination Law (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz), which imple-
ments requirements originating from various European Union directives, explicitly
forbids a disadvantageous treatment of trade union members. By analogy, also a
differential treatment of non-members is restricted. In particular, it is not possible
to prohibit firms from extending potentially preferential regulations for members of
a trade union to non-members.
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In the European Union, maximum working hours and the minimum duration of paid
vacation are laid down in the European Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC) from
2003. This directive, inter alia, requires four weeks of paid annual leave. In Germany,
the Federal Vacation Law (Bundesurlaubsgesetz) establishes entitlements which are
consistent with the Directive. The law was introduced in 1963 and created an
entitlement to 18 days of paid vacation on the basis of six working days per week. This
minimum overall vacation period was raised to 4 weeks in 1994. The Federal Vacation
Law rules out the possibility to substitute additional wage payments for such vacation
entitlements if they are not used, unless the employment relationship is terminated.
For the first 6 months of an employment contract, often matching the probationary
period, the right to take paid vacation only exists on a pro rata basis. Since vacation enti-
tlements are based on calendar years, employees can generally use remaining entitlements
in the first months of the subsequent year. In addition to paid vacation entitlements, there
are between 9 and 13 public holidays in Germany. Their number varies across federal
states and regions and also depends on calendar dates (see Ray et al. 2013).
Against this legal background, actual working time arrangements are codified in indi-
vidual contracts or collective bargaining agreements. The scarce empirical evidence
suggests that paid vacation entitlements agreed upon in collective bargaining contracts
are often close or equal to 30 days per annum (WSI 2014). With regard to restrictions
on vacations within the first months of an employment relationship, individual contrac-
tual agreements or collectively bargained clauses which improve the employees’ oppor-
tunities to take paid vacation are always feasible. Consequently, the legal regulations
outlined above constitute a constraint for a relatively small group of employees.
3 Data description and empirical strategy
To investigate the influence of individual trade union membership on vacation leave,
we use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a nationally represen-
tative survey conducted each year since 1984 with about 20,000 participants belonging
to approximately 11,000 households in recent waves.6 The (retrospective) question on
vacation days has been asked from 1985 to 1990, as well as in the years 2000, 2005 and
2010 and reads as follows: “How many days of vacation did you actually take last
year?”.7 Accordingly, the SOEP provides data on paid vacation from 1984 to 1989 and
for the years 1999, 2004 and 2009. Information on individual trade union membership
is available for 1985, 1989, 1993, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2011. Table 5 in the
Appendix summarises this temporal aspect of the data.
Apparently, we can use responses for the years 1985 and 1989 directly. However,
when exclusively concentrating on these years, we would leave unused the data on vac-
ation from other years. In order to avoid this loss of information, we impute the infor-
mation on union membership and take advantage of the panel dimension of our data.
In Section 5, we additionally report findings from two different complete case analyses.
We employ two versions of a simple imputation (SI) strategy and, additionally, a mul-
tiple imputation (MI) approach. First, in addition to the years 1985 and 1989, we use
union membership information only if a respondent has answered the relevant question
identically in the closest waves before and after the respective wave containing informa-
tion on vacation. We denote this procedure as simple imputation 1 (SI 1). For example,
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identical union membership status information in the survey years 1985 and 1989. In
this case, we assume that the particular membership status also holds for interjacent
years, such as 1986. A second, less restrictive simple imputation strategy, labelled
simple imputation 2 (SI 2), allows for changes in union membership status between
two waves which comprise the relevant information. In particular, we assume that those
respondents change their membership status in the middle of the corresponding time
interval, who state to be a member in one wave and no longer to belong to a trade
union in the subsequent wave with the pertinent information, and vice versa.8 Taking
again the example of the years 1985 and 1989, this strategy implies that a change is
assumed to take place in 1987. For the year 1986, we consequently use the information
received in 1985, whereas we employ the membership status observed in 1989 in the
years 1987 and 1988. Furthermore, the simple imputation approach 2 (SI 2) implies
that we can use information from respondents who provide information on
membership only in some waves by imputing the status from the most adjacent waves.
Accordingly, an individual would, for example, belong to the sample from 1987 to 1989
if we only have the membership information in 1989. These two simple strategies allow
imputing the union membership status for about 80% (SI 1) to more than 95% (SI 2) of
the observations with information about the number of vacation days taken and all co-
variates described later on in this chapter (see Table 6 in the Appendix).
Second, we multiply impute the missing values for the years 1986 to 1988, 1999,
2004 and 2009 based on the complete case information on individual union member-
ship and paid vacation information in 1985 and 1989 (denoted as multiple imputation,
MI). In this case, we use all covariates and the respective outcome variable of the
analysis models as well as party preferences, intensity of party preferences, factor vari-
ables of the survey weights (i.e. quintiles) as well as individual information on union
membership status in other SOEP waves in our binary logit imputation models.9 Since
preliminary regression exercises indicated potential gender-specific parameter hetero-
geneity, we separately impute the missing union membership information for both gen-
der groups. This allows the association between paid vacation and union membership
to differ between males and females. The number of imputations is m = 60.
An important determinant of the actual duration of vacation is the vacation entitle-
ment (cf. Ohtake 2003, Altonji and Usui 2007 and Schnitzlein 2012). Given the fact that
such entitlements are an important component of collective bargaining agreements in
Germany, which apply to 60 to 80% of all employees, they also indirectly capture the
impact of such agreements. The information with respect to vacation entitlements is
only available for the waves 2000, 2005 and 2010 (see Table 5 in the Appendix) and
can, hence, not be employed in the multiple imputation procedure. Contrary to the
question relating to vacation days taken, the enquiry concerning entitlements does not
explicitly refer to the previous year. Since both questions are asked consecutively in the
SOEP questionnaire, it is nevertheless likely that survey participants refer to the same
year when answering those questions. 10
Our sample consists of regular employees with a minimum tenure of 12 months. By
imposing such a lower boundary on tenure we can eliminate most of those employees
from the sample who have not yet completed their probationary period and may only
be able to make limited use of their vacation entitlement. Additionally, we exclude civil
Goerke et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:17 Page 8 of 26servants (Beamte), for whom different legal regulations apply than for regular em-
ployees, as well as self-employed. Finally, explicit information with regard to a worker’s
coverage by a collective bargaining agreement is only available in the SOEP data for
1995, while respondents have been asked about the existence of a works council in
2001, 2006 and 2011. Therefore, we can only indirectly ascertain the effects of these
institutions on vacation (cf. Section 5).
Since we have unbalanced panel data at hand, we start with a standard linear unob-
served effects panel model:
vit ¼ xitβþ umitγ þ ci þ εit ð1Þ
In equation (1), vit is the number of vacation days taken by individual i in period t.The covariate vector xit consists of variables such as age, dummy variables for being
foreign, having completed an apprenticeship, obtained a university degree, working
part-time, having a temporary contract, and being a white-collar employee, as well as
tenure and tenure squared. Furthermore, xit includes different firm size categories
(20 to 199, 200 to 1999, and 2000 or more employees) and the regional unemploy-
ment rate at the level of the federal state (Bundesland). Additionally, we incorporate
dummy variables capturing the survey year and the sector (NACE 1-digit) in which the
respondent works. Our main variable of interest in equation (1) is denoted by umit,
indicating an individual’s union membership status. The unobserved individual effect is
denoted as ci and εit is the idiosyncratic error term.
In a first step, we estimate the parameters of equation (1) by pooled OLS under the
assumption that E x
0
ituit
  ¼ 0, where uit = ci + εit. In a second step, we apply the linear
fixed-effects estimator (FE) under the assumption that E x
0
isuit
  ¼ 0 for all s and t. The
FE estimator allows for ci to be correlated with all elements of xit and umit.
Our dependent variable is a count variable, such that the use of count data panel
models may be advocated. Therefore, we also employ the following correlated-random-
effects Poisson model (CRE_Poisson):
E vit jxit ; cið Þ ¼ ci exp xitβþ umitγð Þ and ci ¼ exp ψ þ xiξ þ umiτð Þai; ð2Þ
where xi is a vector of individual-specific means of some time-varying covariates, umi
is the individual-specific average of union membership status and ai is independent of
xi with unit mean. We apply a generalised estimating equations (GEE) approach with
exchangeable working correlation to estimate the average partial effects (APE) of the
variables of interest (Wooldridge 2013). The estimated APEs then allow for a direct
comparison with the FE-coefficients. SOEP weights are used in all regressions to
account for survey design as well as panel attrition.
4 Results
Overall union density in our multiply imputed data set is about 29%. On average,
35.4% of male employees are trade union members, whereas the membership rate is
19.6% for female employees. This ratio has not changed much over time. The informa-
tion is consistent with data from other sources since in 2013 more than two thirds of
the 6 million members of the largest trade union federation in Germany, Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), were male.11 Table 1 reports some additional descriptive
statistics differentiated by gender and trade union membership status.










N° of vacation days taken 28.098 29.205 27.491 27.543 29.093 27.166
Demographics:
Age 41.882 42.899 41.331 40.631 42.301 40.223
Foreigner 0.156 0.171 0.147 0.134 0.146 0.131
Highest qualification:
Apprenticeship 0.729 0.755 0.715 0.681 0.677 0.682
Academic degree 0.136 0.079 0.167 0.103 0.100 0.104
Workplace Context:
Tenure 13.099 15.032 12.040 10.495 12.831 9.926
Part-time 0.014 0.010 0.016 0.349 0.230 0.378
Temporary Contract 0.039 0.032 0.043 0.052 0.032 0.056
Firm size: < 20 0.156 0.053 0.212 0.231 0.044 0.280
Firm size: 20 ≥ & < 200 0.287 0.212 0.328 0.299 0.273 0.302
Firm size: 200≥ & < 2000 0.265 0.317 0.236 0.254 0.341 0.233
Firm size: ≥ 2000 0.292 0.418 0.224 0.216 0.342 0.185
White-collar worker 0.471 0.324 0.552 0.744 0.640 0.769
Years 1999, 2004 and 2009 only:
N° of vacation days taken 27.308 28.233 26.863 27.195 28.541 26.868
Vacation Entitlements in Days 29.676 30.072 29.486 29.157 30.195 28.905
Note: SOEP 1985–2010. SOEP weights are used. Each multiply imputed data set (m = 60) is an unbalanced panel of the
particular survey years with N_all: 31302 (N_ ≥ 1999: 13916)
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year, that is, about two days more than non-members, independently of the employees’
gender. The data on vacation entitlements for the 3 years, for which this information is
available, depicted in the lower part of Table 1, suggests that the difference in days of
vacation taken may be partly due to higher entitlements for union members.
Additionally, members and non-members differ in other characteristics. Firstly, trade
union members have higher tenure. Since other contributions suggest that vacation
days rise with the time spent in a firm (cf. Green and Potepan 1988, Bryan 2006,
Maume 2006, Fakih 2014), tenure might partially explain why members have more time
off from work. Secondly, union members are more likely to work in larger firms. The
studies by Green (1997), Ohtake (2003), Bryan (2006), and Maume (2006) indicate that
the number of vacation days rises with firm size. Thus, the high rate of union members
working in relatively large firms might be a further explanation for the raw difference
in vacation days between members and non-members. Thirdly, the fraction of male
non-members having a university degree is almost three times as large as that of their
unionised counterparts. Moreover, there is some evidence that years of education and
vacation are associated positively (Bryan 2006, Maume 2006, Fakih 2014). Therefore,
the raw difference in days of vacation depicted in the first row of Table 1 may be less
than the true membership impact on account of differential educational attainments.
Using regression analysis, we can control for the factors mentioned above and other
observed differences in order to isolate the pure union membership vacation
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three imputation methods, are presented in Table 2. First, we use all the observations
in our sample (specifications (1), (4) and (7)). Second, we estimate the model separately
by gender because the relative weight of work and family might differ between men
and women. Such differences could result in distinctions in vacation use, as suggested
by Green and Potepan (1988) and Altonji and Usui (2007) for the United States, Bryan
(2006) the United Kingdom, and Fakih (2014) for Canada.
The estimated parameters reported in Table 2 clarify that the number of
vacation days rises with age and is higher for foreigners. Moreover, vacation days
increase with tenure up to about 25 years of tenure (average effect of specifica-
tions (1), (4), and (7) in Table 2). Additionally, our results support previous find-
ings that vacation days increase with firm size. Lastly, we obtain evidence
suggesting that part-time workers, who are mostly female in Germany, take fewer
vacation days.
Turning to the main variable of interest, the first row of Table 2 shows that the
estimated coefficient of the union membership dummy is, on average, about 0.8 for
men, almost unity for women, and about 0.9 for the entire sample. The union member-
ship vacation differential is estimated consistently across imputation methods. This
indicates the robustness of our results. The estimated coefficients translate into an
increase of the days of vacation taken ranging from 2.8% of the total duration of
vacation for males to 3.6% for female employees. This suggests that women may benefit
more from union membership in terms of vacation days than men. However, adding an
additional interaction term for being female and a member of a trade union to
specifications (1), (4) and (7) does not affect the estimated parameter of the union
membership dummy, while the estimated parameters of the interaction term are never
significantly different from zero (results not documented). Therefore, the correlation
between individual union membership and the number of vacation days does not vary
with gender, in contrast to other countries (cf. Green and Potepan 1988, Bryan 2006,
Altonji and Usui 2007 and Fakih 2014). Consequently, in the remainder of the paper,
we focus on a pooled sample of men and women.
In Table 3, we report the findings from linear fixed-effects (FE) as well as correlated-
random-effects (CRE_Poisson) specifications. We observe positive and significant
effects of working in larger firms (with 200 employees or more) on vacation days of
about half the magnitude as those obtained in pooled OLS specifications. The esti-
mated tenure coefficients have the same signs and are in general significantly different
from zero in correlated-random-effects (CRE_Poisson) specifications. Most importantly,
the estimated coefficients of the union membership dummy in the FE specifications based
on the second simple imputation method (SI 2) and on the multiply imputed data set
(MI) are significantly different from zero at the 6 and 9% level, respectively. They indicate
that individual membership can raise the annual number of vacations days taken by about
a third to at most 45% of a day. Using the same back-of-the envelope approach as
employed in the introduction, the monetary equivalent of this effect is about one sixth to
a quarter (0.35/0.44 days of vacation) of the annual membership fee of one per cent of
gross income.
The average partial effect (APE) of trade union membership and its standard error in
the CRE_Poisson specifications based on the second simple imputation method (SI 2)
Table 2 Paid vacation and union membership in Germany (Pooled OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Simple Imputation 1 (SI 1) Simple Imputation 2 (SI 2) Multiple Imputation (MI)
All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women
Union Membership (umit) 0.900*** 0.857*** 0.944*** 0.889*** 0.752*** 1.059*** 0.881*** 0.798*** 0.965***
(0.192) (0.253) (0.269) (0.160) (0.208) (0.234) (0.202) (0.261) (0.314)
Age 0.054*** 0.042** 0.073*** 0.050*** 0.033** 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.030** 0.059***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012)
Foreigner 0.854*** 0.902*** 0.886** 0.994*** 0.918*** 1.187** 0.880*** 0.917*** 0.885
(0.229) (0.257) (0.441) (0.256) (0.243) (0.579) (0.256) (0.241) (0.576)
Apprenticeship 0.147 0.195 −0.124 0.105 0.164 −0.164 −0.016 0.169 −0.420
(0.240) (0.304) (0.376) (0.212) (0.265) (0.334) (0.207) (0.257) (0.334)
Academic degree 0.598 0.517 0.483 0.588* 0.429 0.609 0.285 0.247 0.210
(0.372) (0.444) (0.483) (0.352) (0.415) (0.627) (0.335) (0.396) (0.585)
Tenure 0.105*** 0.073** 0.157*** 0.102*** 0.068** 0.153*** 0.111*** 0.076*** 0.163***
(0.026) (0.033) (0.042) (0.023) (0.030) (0.039) (0.023) (0.029) (0.039)
Tenure2 −0.003*** −0.001* −0.005*** −0.002*** −0.001 −0.004*** −0.002*** −0.001* −0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Part-time −0.527* −0.084 −0.671** −0.590** −0.239 −0.723*** −0.669*** −0.622 −0.782***
(0.278) (1.639) (0.272) (0.243) (1.284) (0.243) (0.240) (1.245) (0.242)
Temporary contract 0.151 0.641 −0.370 −0.064 0.262 −0.429 −0.097 0.304 −0.532
(0.544) (0.955) (0.509) (0.464) (0.778) (0.445) (0.453) (0.763) (0.441)
Firm size: 20≥ & < 200 1.705*** 0.939*** 2.623*** 1.671*** 1.127*** 2.393*** 1.766*** 1.303*** 2.408***
(0.229) (0.320) (0.330) (0.204) (0.280) (0.298) (0.204) (0.282) (0.296)
Firm size: 200≥ & < 2000 2.787*** 2.448*** 3.041*** 2.772*** 2.711*** 2.752*** 2.857*** 2.879*** 2.768***














Table 2 Paid vacation and union membership in Germany (Pooled OLS) (Continued)
Firm size: ≥ 2000 3.289*** 2.893*** 3.601*** 3.228*** 3.146*** 3.240*** 3.393*** 3.414*** 3.270***
(0.236) (0.326) (0.353) (0.215) (0.292) (0.335) (0.222) (0.306) (0.344)
White-collar Worker 0.040 −0.147 0.645* 0.016 −0.177 0.580** 0.026 −0.171 0.592**
(0.193) (0.221) (0.330) (0.169) (0.199) (0.294)
(0.168) (0.197) (0.292)
Unemployment Rate −0.013 −0.076** 0.068** −0.015 −0.069** 0.053* −0.062*** −0.116*** 0.007
(0.025) (0.036) (0.032) (0.021) (0.030) (0.028) (0.018) (0.025) (0.027)
Female −0.122 −0.040 −0.027
(0.190) (0.174) (0.172)
Constant 22.771*** 24.126*** 20.889*** 22.882*** 24.059*** 21.294*** 22.910*** 23.943*** 21.558***
(0.511) (0.644) (0.852) (0.480) (0.591) (0.813) (0.468) (0.578) (0.755)
N 26394 15559 10835 30359 18056 12303 31302 18578 12724
NI (number of imputed values) 19556 11284 8272 23521 13781 9740 24464 14303 10161
n (number of individuals) 11670 6465 5205 12909 7173 5736 13179 7317 5862
Wald_x (df) 926.9*** (31) 629.1*** (30) 366.9*** (30) 1016.8*** (31) 729.9*** (30) 357.9*** (30) 892.9*** (23) 608.3*** (22) 323.8*** (22)
Note: SOEP 1985–2010. MI: Each imputed data set (m = 60) is an unbalanced panel of the particular survey years with N_all: 31302
Dependent variable: Number of paid vacation days taken per year. Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01














Table 3 Paid vacation and union membership in Germany (Panel Data Models)
Linear Fixed-Effects (FE) Correlated-Random-Effects Poisson (CRE_Poisson) (APEs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Simple Imputation 1 (SI 1) Simple Imputation 2 (SI 2) Multiple Imputation (MI) Simple Imputation 1 (SI 1) Simple Imputation 2 (SI 2) Multiple Imputation (MI)
Union Membership (umit) 0.224 (0.370) 0.441* (0.232) 0.349* (0.204) 0.188 (0.352) 0.421* (0.226) 0.357 (0.224)
Mean Union Membership (umi ) -- -- -- 0.596 (0.421) 0.486 (0.309) 0.511* (0.304)
Tenure 0.012 (0.033) 0.012 (0.030) 0.029 (0.028) 0.064*** (0.024) 0.065*** (0.023) 0.020 (0.024)
Tenure2 −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001** (0.001) −0.002** (0.001) −0.002*** (0.001)
Part-time −0.647 (0.400) −0.672* (0.352) −0.636* (0.350) −0.567** (0.283) −0.477* (0.254) −0.537** (0.249)
Temporary contract −0.049 (0.521) −0.177 (0.449) −0.148 (0.447) 0.200 (0.461) −0.049 (0.394) 0.067 (0.376)
Firm size: 20≥ & < 200 0.376 (0.361) 0.397 (0.317) 0.384 (0.313) 0.553 (0.363) 0.628* (0.332) 0.535 (0.335)
Firm size: 200≥ & < 2000 1.564*** (0.454) 1.528*** (0.388) 1.463*** (0.387) 1.793*** (0.440) 1.714*** (0.390) 1.575*** (0.390)
Firm size: ≥ 2000 1.549*** (0.431) 1.699*** (0.377) 1.690*** (0.383) 1.768*** (0.431) 2.004*** (0.393) 1.894*** (0.398)
Unemployment rate 0.094 (0.064) 0.078 (0.059) −0.075* (0.041) −0.005 (0.024) −0.006 (0.022) −0.064** (0.020)
N 21028 24938 25776 21028 24938 25776
NI (number of imputed values) 14928 18031 19697 14928 18031 19697
n (number of individuals) 6226 7384 7653 6226 7384 7653
Wald_x (df) 60.4*** (25) 75.26*** (25) 45.9*** (17) 601.6*** (32) 690.5*** (32) 600.88*** (27)
Note: SOEP 1985–2010. MI: Each imputed data set (m = 60) is an unbalanced panel of the particular survey years with N_all: 31302
Dependent variable: Number of paid vacation days taken per year. Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Additionally controlled for industries (NACE 1-digit) & survey year. SOEP weights are used














Goerke et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:17 Page 14 of 26and the multiply imputed data set (MI) are very similar in size to the FE-estimates,
though marginally insignificant in the MI case. Moreover, we find comparable esti-
mated APEs of the individual-specific mean of trade union membership in both
above-mentioned cases, once again marginally insignificant for one imputation
approach (SI 2). The estimated APEs indicate that more than 50% of the pooled
OLS union-membership vacation premium of one day is due to selection into
union membership. Reassuringly, in all CRE_Poisson specifications the two esti-
mated APEs of union membership broadly add up to the size of the pooled OLS
union membership vacation differential of 0.9 days.
In sum, the various linear fixed-effects and CRE_Poisson specifications are compat-
ible with an interpretation according to which individual union membership can cause
annual vacation days to rise by at most half a day. The larger part of the pooled
OLS-vacation differential, however, is due to selection effects.5 Robustness checks
In this section, we look at two issues: First, does the imputation of individual trade
union membership affect results? Second, are our findings limited to or primarily deter-
mined by the behaviour of particular employees?125.1 Complete case analyses
The results presented in Section 4 rely on different strategies to impute the individual
union membership status for all those years for which vacation data is available, but no
information with respect to membership is contained in the SOEP questionnaire.
Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that the findings are qualitatively unaffected by the type of
imputation method applied – SI 1, SI 2, or MI. To further gauge the robustness of our
findings with regard to the imputation strategy as such, we restrict our sample to years
for which information on both of our main variables exists. First, we estimate specifica-
tions (1) and (2) for the years 1985 and 1989 only, for which we have complete contem-
poraneous information about individual trade union membership and vacation days
(complete case (CC); see Table 5 in the Appendix). Second, we combine information
on union membership in a given year t with data on vacation days in the subsequent
year t + 1. The resulting sample is based on information for the pairs of years 1985/6,
1998/9 and 2003/4 (see Table 5 in the Appendix) and denoted as quasi-complete case
(QCC). The advantage of the QCC-setting, relative to the complete case analysis (CC),
is that the sample size increases substantially, since we can use more recent infor-
mation additionally, and that union membership is predetermined with regard to the
observed choice of vacation days.
The estimated coefficients of the union membership variable for the pooled OLS
specifications depicted in Table 4 are broadly similar to those shown in Table 2. In
particular, we continue to observe a sizeable union membership vacation differential.
When we exploit the panel dimension of the data, we can again discern a significant
but notably lower effect of union membership on paid vacation, but only for the
estimations based on the quasi-complete case setting (QCC). All in all, the findings
presented in Section 4 can, hence, be regarded as robust with respect to the imputation
of union membership information.13
Table 4 Paid vacation and union membership (Complete Case Analyses)
Pooled OLS Linear Fixed-Effects (FE) Correlated-Random Effects Poisson (CRE_Poisson) (APEs)
CC QCC CC QCC CC QCC
Union Membership (umit) 0.731*** (0.246) 1.021*** (0.188) 0.261 (0.677) 0.887** (0.416) 0.22 (0.662) 0.667* (0.392)
Mean Union Membership (umi ) -- -- -- -- 0.47 (0.63) 0.062 (0.468)
Wald_x (df) 371.0*** (24) 608.1*** (26) 21.37 (18) 45.34*** (20) 181.21*** (24) 230.89*** (28)
N 6838 13575 4262 6145 4262 6145
n (number of individuals) 4717 10291 2131 2832 2131 2832
Note: SOEP. CC: Complete case analysis, based on information for the years 1985, 1989
QCC: Quasi-complete case analysis, based on information for the pairs of years 1985/6, 1998/9, 2003/4
Dependent variable: Number of paid vacation days taken per year
Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Additional covariates: see Tables 2 and 3. SOEP weights are used
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In order to investigate whether our results are affected by particular legal regulations
or employer as well as employee characteristics, we re-estimated our specifications for
various subsamples. Subsequently, we summarise the findings relating to the variables
of main interest, focussing on the imputed data sets.14
First, we look at employees who are very likely to be covered by collective bargaining
and to work in plants in which a works council exists. The idea is to make our esti-
mates contingent on work places in which collective bargaining determines vacation
entitlements and works councils represent the interests of employees. In particular, we
focus on a subsample of people who work in firms with at least 2,000 employees. In
this subgroup, collective bargaining coverage has always been high and still exceeds
90%. Moreover, according to Ellguth and Kohaut (2013), who analyse data by Institute
for Employment Research, 88% (95%) of the employees working in establishments with
more than 500 employees were represented by a works council in 2012 (1998).
Additionally, own calculations on the basis of SOEP data for the years 2001, 2006 and
2011 indicate that the coverage by works councils was about 90% in plants with more
than 2,000 employees. Finally, bargaining and works council coverage have hardly
changed in large plants over the last decades.
We observe significant estimated coefficients of the union membership dummies in
the pooled OLS specifications of the same magnitude for the sample of individuals who
work in large firms, as for the entire sample (cf. Table 2). This indicates that the union
membership vacation premium is not predominantly driven by selection into work
places with collective bargaining and works council coverage. However, we find no evi-
dence of an individual union membership effect in the two panel-data specifications
and higher estimated coefficients of individual averaged union membership in the
CRE_Poisson specifications, relative to the full sample (cf. Table 3). These results sug-
gest that selection into union membership may be even more important in larger than
in smaller firms with regard to paid vacation use.
Second, we focus on a sample of employees for whom we have information about
vacation entitlements. By doing so, we can tackle the question of whether trade union
members take more days of paid vacation, simply because they are entitled to longer
vacations, in line with the anecdotal evidence reported in the introduction. Because
information on vacation entitlements is only available for three waves in more recent
years (see Table 5 in the Appendix), we cannot apply the multiple imputation proced-
ure which is based on complete case information for 1985 and 1989. We subsequently
report the findings of estimating equation (1) by pooled OLS, adding the vacation
entitlement as an additional covariate, since exploiting the panel dimension of the data
yields no significant results. The union membership vacation premium shrinks by more
than 50% relative to the full sample, while the estimated coefficients of vacation
entitlement are significantly positive with a magnitude of 0.86. This suggests that in
Germany employees, on average, do not fully exploit their vacation entitlements (see
also Saborowski 2005 and Schnitzlein 2012). Therefore, the pooled OLS-union mem-
bership vacation differential is mitigated if entitlements are accounted for, but cannot
be entirely due to selection into high-entitlement jobs or firms.
Third, we restrict our sample to those employees who do not change their employer.
Using this more selective sample of firm stayers, the estimated OLS-coefficients
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itionally, when we apply the FE-estimator, we find a parameter estimate of 0.376 based
on the multiple imputation strategy, which resembles the results from the main sample
but is not significant at conventional levels (α = 0.152). Moreover, the estimated param-
eter of individual averaged union membership in the CRE_Poisson specification is
significantly different from zero and again indicates that selection into union membership
is important. Since the FE-estimator is based on a sample of firm stayers and, hence,
implicitly controls for firm-fixed effects, time-invariant personnel policies do not seem to
have an important effect on the observed union membership vacation differential.
Fourth, we look at the main segments of the economy. More precisely, we estimate
our specifications separately for the private and the public sector and differentiate
between the industrial and the service sector. The rationale for the first distinction is
the argument that unions in the public sector may not be comparable to private sector
unions as, for example, evidenced by differential union density and collective bargain-
ing coverage rates. Therefore, the impact of individual union membership on vacation
use may also vary. The second distinction is motivated by the fact that trade unions
and works councils have traditionally played a more important role in industry than in
services.
When we restrict our sample to respondents who work in the private sector, the
estimated union membership coefficients are comparable to those obtained for the full
sample depicted in Tables 2 and 3, with the exception of the FE and CRE_Poisson spec-
ifications based on the second simple imputation strategy (SI 2). Furthermore, we do
not observe a systematic relationship between vacation days and union membership for
public sector workers. With regard to the second distinction, separate estimations for
industry and services yield significant pooled OLS-estimates of the union membership
dummy which are about twice as large in magnitude in services as in the industrial sec-
tor. Additionally, the FE specification for the service sector using the sample based on
the second simple imputation approach (SI 2) yields a significant coefficient of individ-
ual union membership which is about twice the magnitude of that detected for the full
sample (cf. Table 3, specification (2)). Finally, the estimated coefficients of individual
averaged union membership in the CRE_Poisson specifications for the industrial sector
are significantly different from zero for the simple imputation approaches (SI 1, SI 2),
while this is not the case with respect to services. Accordingly, our evidence suggests
that the union membership vacation premium might vary across sectors and that it is
predominantly a private sector phenomenon.
Finally, we investigate whether the union membership vacation differential varies with
work experience. In order to do so, we separately estimate specifications for subgroups
of individuals with less than 10 years of full-time experience, between 10 and 22, and
more than 22 years.15 The idea underlying these subgroup analyses is that experience
and union membership are substitutes with respect to information about how to utilise
vacation entitlements. Furthermore, more experienced workers may be better protected
against dismissals and face less severe career consequences when taking vacation. Con-
sequently, union membership can be expected to have more of an impact on vacation
use for less experienced workers.
The estimated coefficients of the union membership dummy become substantially
larger for the group of less-experienced workers than those depicted in Tables 2 and 3
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ence are smaller and estimated less precisely. Therefore, these results are compatible
with the idea that unions provide members with goods or services which individuals
can only acquire after a lengthy period of work, such as information or the possibility
to make complete use of legal entitlements. However, some care has to be taken when
putting forward this interpretation, given that union members are on average older,
have higher tenure, work more often full-time and are, therefore, more experienced
than non-members (see Table 1).
Taken together, our results for various subgroups confirm the existence of a union
membership vacation differential and underline the great importance of selection into
membership as an explanation. The magnitude of the vacation differential varies across
subgroups, but it still exists if vacation entitlements are taken into account as an
additional covariate, when bargaining and works council coverage and time-invariant
firm characteristics are indirectly accounted for, and it is particularly large in services.
6 Conclusions
Reductions in working time have been a longstanding objective of trade unions. While
the focus has been on weekly working hours, an extension of annual paid vacations has
also been a prominent issue in many European countries. A relationship between the
strength of trade unions and vacations can arise, at least, via two channels. Trade unions
may negotiate higher vacation entitlements, such that all employees covered by collective
bargaining agreements will benefit. Second, trade union membership may enable
employees to take extra vacation days. Given the industrial relations setting in Germany,
where collective contracts are generally applied to all employees in a firm irrespective of
whether they belong to a trade union or not, we focus on the second channel and enquire
whether an individual’s union membership status affects the duration of vacation.
Our pooled OLS-estimates indicate that trade union members have almost one day
more paid vacation than non-members annually, controlling for a host of demographic
and workplace-related variables. Taken at face value, the monetary equivalent of this
union membership vacation premium is 0.5% of annual gross income. It covers about
50% of the union membership fee in Germany and thereby points to a remarkable pri-
vate gain from individual trade union membership. However, this effect is substantially
smaller in magnitude than the union membership vacation differential estimated in
various studies for the United States of about 3 to 5 days (Green and Potepan 1988,
Buchmueller et al. 2004, Maume 2006, Altonji and Usui 2007). When we exploit the
panel data dimension of our data set and estimate linear fixed-effects and nonlinear
correlated-random-effects specifications, the estimated coefficient of the union mem-
bership dummy is no longer significant at conventional standards in our preferred
specifications based on the imputed data sets, but only at the 10%-level in two out of
three cases. Moreover, the magnitude of the union membership vacation premium
shrinks to around 0.4 days. Hence, the larger part of the OLS-union membership
vacation premium seems to be driven by self-selection into union membership. This
interpretation is supported by evidence from various subgroup-specific analyses.
These results are of great relevance from an industrial relations perspective because
they indicate a dilemma for trade unions: The upper limit for a possible gain in vac-
ation due to union membership, as indicated by the FE-estimates, is relatively small
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pecuniary motives. However, a union membership vacation premium of an extra day of
vacation, irrespective of whether this is a true membership or a selection effect,
indicates that the effective labour costs of union members will be higher than those of
non-members by about 0.5%, and this might have a detrimental effect on their (re-)
employment probabilities.
Our findings also indicate areas for future research. First, the results for various sub-
groups indicate that the estimated average union membership vacation differential
might vary notably across sectors and industries. In particular, it seems that individual
union membership may enhance vacations to a greater extent in sectors in which trade
unions have usually been weaker, such as in services. Additionally, we do not observe a
union vacation differential in the public sector which has traditionally been a strong-
hold of trade unions. If the vacation effect is particularly pronounced in work environ-
ments where trade unions are relatively weak, this might indicate a remarkable private
gain for some union members. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to look into
the potential heterogeneity of the union membership vacation differential in more
detail. Second, based on the information from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we
can only speculate why individual union membership enables employees to take more
vacation. Better information of members about entitlements might explain part of it,
but we still observe a union membership vacation differential contingent on vacation
entitlements and for respondents with substantial periods of work experience. Better
protection against dismissals (e.g. Goerke and Pannenberg 2011) might also add to the
explanation of the vacation differential.
Endnotes
1See Schnitzlein (2012) for Germany, Altonji and Usui (2007) for the United States,
and Bryan (2006) for the United Kingdom.
2Note that Fakih (2014) combines information on coverage and individual union
membership, whereas Shi and Skuterud (2015) present evidence with respect to the
probability of being absent in a reference week due to vacation. Freeman (1981) fur-
thermore shows that the costs of vacation pay in the United States are higher if there is
collective bargaining.
3According numbers are provided by Visser (2013) with respect to bargaining (or
union) coverage, labelled adjusted coverage (AdjCov) and union density (UD_s),
respectively.
4See the article in the newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung (in German) (http://
www.sueddeutsche.de/karriere/mitarbeiter-erster-klasse-1.947983; January 30, 2014). In
the United Kingdom, the University and College Union, for example, states that “union
members …receive … more holiday … than non-members.” (UCU factsheet 01; http://
www.ucu.org.uk/media/pdf/2/d/UCU_factsheet1_unions.pdf; February 27, 2014).
5According to a representative survey conducted on behalf of the public sector union
ver.di, almost 20% of respondents did not know that there is a legal minimum vacation
entitlement in Germany, more than 25% were not aware of its magnitude and a quarter
of those asked were unacquainted with the fact that the employer could not unilaterally
determine the date of vacations. Furthermore, the campaign (in German) by ver.di re-
lating to the trade unions’ success in contractually establishing and extending
Goerke et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:17 Page 20 of 26vacation entitlements in Germany beyond the legal minimum emphasises the role
of the union in enforcing such claims (http://www.verdi.de/themen/arbeit/aktions-
woche-urlaub-2013; January 30, 2014).
6Wagner et al. (2007) provide more detailed information on the SOEP data. See also:
http://www.diw.de/english/soep/29012.html.
7Own translation. Until 1990, the question had a small supplement, asking for being
employed in the previous year: “If you were employed in 19xx: How many days of
vacation did you take last year?”. Thereafter, the structure of the survey changed so that
this supplement was not necessary anymore. Furthermore, in the three most recent
waves the question explicitly referred to working days.
8This date of change is determined as (t + x)/2 if t + x is even or as (t + x + 1)/2 if t + x is
an odd number, with t and x, t < x, denoting the years of two adjacent waves in which union
membership information is available. We also implemented two further simple imputation
strategies. If membership information changes from year t to year x, we assume (i) that the
membership status alters at the beginning of the period of incomplete information, that is
in t + 1, or (ii) at the end of the relevant interval (that is in x). The results obtained when
using these alternative imputation strategies are not reported since they are comparable.
9See Seaman et al. (2012) and White et al. (2010) for details with respect to the mul-
tiple imputation procedure. We outline our approach in more detail in the Appendix.
10The relevant question is “How many vacation days can you take according to your
contract?”. Saborowski (2005) and Schnitzlein (2012) use this question and the one
relating to days actually taken to analyse the determinants of the difference between
vacation entitlement and vacation use.
11See http://www.dgb.de/uber-uns/dgb-heute/mitgliederzahlen/2010. In line with our
data, Visser (2013) reports an average union density for Germany for the period 1985
to 2010 of 27%.
12A documentation of the entire set of results reported in this section is available
upon request.
13Applying the generalised missing-indicator approach suggested by Dardanoni et al.
(2011) we, furthermore, checked for potential bias induced by improper imputations.
We do not find evidence for such a bias under reasonable assumptions, e.g. the esti-
mated union membership vacation premium is 0.87 using weighted-average least
squares estimators in the pooled data case. We are grateful to an anonymous referee
for suggesting the use of the observed missing data patterns in our analysis.
14Subsample analyses for CC- and QCC-settings are not informative, given the small
number of observations.
15We are grateful to an anonymous referee for the valuable suggestion of pursuing
this subgroup analysis. Note that the cut-off points for the definition of experience
guarantee samples of roughly the same size. However, findings are not sensitive to the
exact specification. Similar results as reported below with respect to SI 1 and SI 2;
working samples are obtained if we add interactions terms to specification (1) and
estimate it for the entire sample.
16Note, that we do not use a conventional deterministic imputation framework where
we should not include the dependent variable of the analysis model of interest, since it
would lead to biased estimates. In the MI framework, the introduced random compo-
nent avoids this bias.
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Temporal Structure of Data and Number of ImputationsTable 5 Information on Vacation and Union Membership in SOEP
Note:
Intermittent years, such as 1991, are omitted for notational convenience because the SOEP questionnaires do not contain
relevant information in those years. For information with respect to the exact timing of questions, see the main text
Cells marked in green ( ) indicate that responses are available for the relevant year
Years marked in red ( ) indicate the years that are used for the complete case analysis (CC)
Cells marked in blue ( ) indicate that responses are used for the quasi-complete case analysis (QCC)
Table 6 Number of observations and of imputed union membership
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1999 2004 2009







SI 2 3275 2807 2945 4151 6096 4247
MI 3275 3018 2945 4169 6131 4926
Note:
Row 1 depicts the number of observations with information on vacation and all covariates. Rows 3 to 5 show the
number of observations for which union membership status is imputed according to the different imputation strategies
in those years for which the SOEP does not provide this information directly
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to days of paid vacation taken and union membership for 1985 and 1989 only. For the
other years, for which information on paid vacation days taken is available (1986, 1987,
1988, 1999, 2004, 2009), we do not have contemporaneous information on union mem-
bership. However, in this case, union membership information is available for adjacent
years (1985, 1989, 1993, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2011). Therefore, we use Multiple
Imputation (MI) to impute the missing union membership information. MI is a
simulation-based approach for analysing incomplete data (see e.g. Rubin 1987, White
et al. 2010 and Cameron/Trivedi 2005). Our MI procedure replaces missing values of
union membership with multiple sets of simulated values to complete the data, applies
standard regression techniques (OLS; FE; CRE_Poisson) to analyse each completed data
set and adjusts the obtained parameter estimates for missing-data uncertainty by means
of Rubin’s Rules.
We use the Stata suite MI (Stata Version 12; StataCorp LP 2011) to perform the MI
exercises. In particular, we use binary logit specifications of a union membership equa-
tion in our imputation model based on the complete data set for the years 1985 and
1989. Most importantly, we exploit the longitudinal structure of our data set at hand
and include a dummy variable indicating individual union membership status in any
other year (umother) as a covariate. Other covariates of our regression models of inter-
est (equations 1 and 2 in the main part of the paper) are also included as well as the
dependent variable of these regression models “days of paid vacation taken” (fvacreal).
The reason for including the dependent variable of the regression models into the
imputation model is that otherwise the missing union membership would be imputed
as though it had no relationship with paid vacation taken. This would bias the
estimated parameter of union membership in our regression models of interest towards
zero (e.g. Allison 2002 or White et al. 2010).16 Moreover, we include the following
auxiliary variables: party preferences (SPD, CDU/CSU, GRUENE), intensity of party
preferences (partystrong) as well as four dummies indicating whether the individual
observation exhibits a survey weight which is located in different quintiles of the
distribution of survey weights in the particular year (q*weight). We separately impute
the missing union membership information for males and females applying Stata MI’s
“by” option. This allows the association between paid vacation and union membership
to differ between males and females. Hence, we can include interactions of gender and
union membership in our regression models of interest without bias (e.g. White et al.
2010) and test whether the union membership vacation differential varies with gender.
The number of imputations is m = 60.
The Stata-listings on the next pages display the results of an example of our MI
procedure.
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